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Queer Politics, Queer Science? Meg Barker in conversation with Peter Hegarty 
 
Peter Hegarty is a lecturer at the University of Surrey and is the Chair of the BPS 
Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section Committee. Address: Department of 
Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH. Telephone: +44 (0)1483 
876865. E-mail: p.hegarty@surrey.ac.uk 
 
Meg Barker is a lecturer at London South Bank University and is Honorary Secretary 
of the BPS Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section Committee. Address: Department of 
Psychology, Faculty of Arts and Human Science, London South Bank University, 103 
Borough Road, London, SE1 0AA. Telephone: +44 (0) 207 8155814. E-mail: 
barkermj@lsbu.ac.uk 
 
In January 2004 Peter Hegarty was elected as Chair of the British Psychological 
Society (BPS) Lesbian and Gay Psychology (LGP) Section Committee. Since that 
time the Section Committee has gone from strength to strength - convening 
workshops and streams of events at BPS conferences, reconsidering the name of the 
Section to make it more inclusive, and voicing concerns over the representation of 
sexualities in psychological and medical journals. The Section publication, Lesbian & 
Gay Psychology Review, is now published three times a year with recent, very full, 
special issues on challenging homophobia, the social construction of lesbianism, and 
sadomasochism. 
 Peter obtained his Ph.D. in experimental social psychology from Stanford 
University in the US, as well as being an accomplished experimentalist, Peter also 
writes as a constructionist social psychologist on such topics as objective and 
projective testing (Hegarty, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c),biological theories of sexual 
orientation (Hegarty, 1997, 2003a), psychoanalysis (2004a), intersex (Hegarty & 
Chase, 2000) and the psychology of prejudice (Hegarty, 2001; Hegarty & Massey, in 
press). As a relatively new member of the LGP Section Committee, I wanted to ask 
about Peter’s vision for the future of the Section. As Peter has placed himself very 
deliberately on both sides of quantitative/qualitative, constructionist/positivist divides, 
I was also curious to hear his opinions on debates about science and politics in the 




PH: The Section was set up in a very hostile environment, and that struggle has been 
well-described by others (Kitzinger & Coyle, 2002; Wilkinson, 1999). When I 
became Chair of the LGP Section in 2004 it was the first time that the Section’s 
Committee contained none of its founding members, but luckily there was a diverse 
range of experience and perspectives represented on the new committee. It seemed 
like an opportune time to move the Section on from the difficult history that formed it 
in the 1990s. The first thing that I did was to write a short position piece for Lesbian 
& Gay Psychology Review suggesting a new vision. I argued that lesbian and gay 
psychology needed to form thicker connections with LGBTQ1 work in other sectors, 
with like-minded psychologists, and with people doing critical work on gender and 
sexuality in other disciplines (Hegarty, 2004b).  
 
MB: ‘Lesbian and gay psychology’ – Is that the best term to describe the field that the 
Section represents? 
 
PH: Probably not. It’s important that ‘psychology’ is in there, as many people outside 
the Section continue to think we are a support group for psychologists who are lesbian 
or gay rather than an organization dedicated to research, clinical expertise, and policy. 
Many people hold the misconception that you have to be lesbian or gay to join the 
Section, so we had a recent edition of Lesbian & Gay Psychology Review devoted to 
the experiences of heterosexual people working in the field. Maybe the word 
‘psychologies’ would be better than ‘psychology’, because we are far from agreement 
within the Section as to what psychology is, and whether if can or should be a science. 
However, the term ‘lesbian and gay’ is becoming increasingly inaccurate, and its 
exclusions are being more keenly felt with time. Some of the most active members of 
the Section – such as yourself – work less on ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ issues and on 
bisexuality, transgender, transsexual, intersex, S/M. It’s getting harder to name the 
area that the Section coheres around without either being exclusionary on the one 
hand, or flattening out important differences on the other.  
 
                                                 
1
 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer. This is the broader, more inclusive, 
term that the LGP section is currently considering using in place of just Lesbian and 
Gay. 
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MB: What about ‘queer’? How does that fit into the Section’s agenda? 
 
PH: Maybe the role of queer is not so much to ‘fit in’ as to remind us of the limits of 
whatever form of inclusiveness the Section accomplishes. I would like to see 
psychologists engage with queer theory at a more substantial level. That could be a 
really useful exchange.  
 
MB: How might queer theory impact on the discussion about what the Section should 
be called? 
 
PH: I don’t think that queer theory would give us any easy answers about how to 
name our field, but it does provide some non-obvious ways of thinking about that 
question. Judith Butler’s (1990) argument from Gender Trouble might be useful here. 
There she points out how political categories such as ‘women’ or ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ 
invariably create divisions among the peoples they are supposed to unify. Instead of 
evaluating such categories in terms of their accuracy, Butler suggests that we look at 
what categories do - at what their performative effects might be. Accordingly, it’s 
useful to think of the name of the Section as a tool for doing things with. What can be 
done with a psychology Section that is called ‘lesbian and gay’ or one that also has 
words like ‘bisexual’, ‘trans’ and ‘queer’ in the title? Which title is more useful, and 
for doing what?  
 
Of course, this is a much more future-oriented question than the one that the BPS 
would have us ask in thinking about the Section’s name. When the Section was set up, 
the BPS required that its founders demonstrate that there was a body of lesbian and 
gay psychological work already being done in Britain. Engagement with queer theory 
might challenge that criterion and optimistically ask instead the question ‘what might 
this Section become?’    
 
MB: Has queer theory influenced your own work? 
 
PH: From the outset. The first article I published used Butler’s work to critique 
biological theories of sexual orientation (Hegarty, 1997), and I still find Butler to be 
really useful in making visible heteronormative assumptions. These days, I’m most 
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interested in explicitly historical work. I am using the tensions between Foucault’s 
work (1978, 1988), actor-network theory (Law & Hassard, 1999) and feminist work 
in science and technology studies (e.g., Haraway, 1991) to think about how 
psychologists position themselves as ‘objective’ in their work, and how those 
positions serve to bolster their claims that their opponents are not objective knowers 
of psychological knowledge but known objects of psychological knowledge (Hegarty, 
2003b). 
 
MB: Can you say more about your understanding of the tensions between Foucault 
and feminism? 
 
First, I think it’s worth pointing to some areas of overlap. Both feminist work and 
Foucauldian work and Marx also of course - realize that the category of ‘nature’ is not 
the limit of power, or of social construction, but the area where power is most 
entrenched, to the point of appearing uncontestable. Both point to disciplines such as 
medicine and biology as places where ‘the natural’ is made up, and prompt 
contestations of that power. However, some early feminist work imagined a domain 
of the natural, or of ‘women’s experience’ or some similar category (e.g., mothering, 
an ethic of care, or lesbian sexuality) that was beyond the effects of power. Foucault 
(1988) saw claims for liberation as intrinsic parts of the workings of power, and 
rejected liberatory and utopian narratives, and made us sceptical about such politics. 
This has been a point of division in feminist thought. Some think that Foucault 
consequently has no politics and proscribes quietism, while others, like Donna 
Haraway (1991) and Judith Butler (1990), for example, advance a much more 
sceptical approach to the natural or the experiential. It all depends on how the 
category of the political is defined.  
 
There is also the problem of androcentrism in Foucault’s work. History of Sexuality, 
Volume 1 (1979), for example, described the invention of ‘sexuality’ as a medical and 
a political category in the nineteenth century. But the sexualities that Foucault 
concentrated on are largely those of men, or of hermaphrodites. There is scant 
attention to the materialization of prostitution as a medical category, a medicalization 
that was very much bound up with Eurocentric views about proper female 
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embodiment. Feminist contemporaries of Foucault - such as Judith Walkowitz (1989) 
- gave us a much less androcentric view of the Victorian era’s sexual ‘others’. 
   
MB: I can see how queer theory would be useful for your critical historical work, but 
isn’t it a bit hypocritical to continue to do experiments at the same time?  
 
PH: Hmm. I get that one a lot, and I have to say that the answer has changed over the 
years. One of the reasons that I moved to the UK from the USA is because 
constructionist work is so under-valued in the US - I really was beginning to feel like 
I was living a curious double-life! Ten years ago I would have described myself as a 
very reluctant experimentalist. I was extremely alienated from the experimental 
department where I did my PhD for multiple reasons. By the time I was finished, I 
was describing experiments as kinds of gender performances that can both re-inscribe 
and disrupt masculinist norms in psychological science (Hegarty, 2001). I still think 
that that is right, and it’s a way for experimentalists to start to do reflexivity which is 
not something experimentalists are trained to do. But in and of itself that’s not a good 
enough reason to start doing experiments.  
 
I think there is an implicit norm in your question: that constructionists shouldn’t do 
science! I find this powerful norm to be almost as damaging as the experimentalists’ 
idea that knowledge consists only of variables. Felicia Pratto and I published a paper 
last year in which we argued that experiments could be used to support constructivist 
arguments, and reported an experiment to show what we meant (Hegarty & Pratto, 
2004). This was a difficult paper to get accepted because of one reviewer who kept 
arguing that we could report experimental findings, or we could make a constructivist 
argument, but we couldn’t do both in the one paper. Maybe it is queer to do 
experiments when they call attention to the constructedness of scientific knowledge, 
and to submit these arguments to the peer review process in the more experimental 
journals. Certainly that subverts any easy binary between ‘mainstream’ and ‘critical’ 
psychology, or ‘essentialism’ and ‘constructionism.’ I couldn’t say that I always know 
how to categorize my own work in those terms. 
 
MB: One of the topics that you address in your experiments is normativity, 
particularly the tendency to take straight people as the norm for larger social 
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categories. Of course ‘heteronormativity’ has been the central object of queer theory. I 
wondered if there a link there?  
 
PH: Very much so. One of the reasons that I started working on norm theory was 
because of the similarity between Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) cognitive account of 
what they called ‘category norms’ and Judith Butler’s (1993) account of 
performativity as citationality. Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) work takes off from the 
limitations of prototype models to account for creative human thinking and the 
phenomenon of surprise. It’s a cognitive theory of how we construct mental 
representations on-the-fly in potentially new ways in different situations. Butler’s 
(1990) work also is about taking political advantage of moments where traditionally 
categories appear to loose their ground. Both theories give us ways of thinking about 
how the normativity of maleness, Whiteness, straightness, etc. might be contested but 
often is not contested and usually goes unnoticed. It was also useful that what little 
empirical work had been done on category norm focused on the construction of 
explanations for gender differences (Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991). Extending that 
work allowed my colleagues and I to put experimental findings and a critique of 
sexology together, and to talk about heteronormativity in a language with which 
social cognition researchers can engage (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001a, 2004, Hegarty, 
Pratto, & Lemieux, 2004).  
 
The same dissatisfaction with heteronormativity has driven a lot of my critical interest 
in biological accounts of sexual orientation. It is not that I see sexual orientation 
(whatever that may be) as a product of nurture rather than nature. For what it’s worth, 
I could write my own story either way by emphasizing some details and overlooking 
others. Rather, it is that the theories of nature that we currently have, routinely take 
the bodies of heterosexuals to be normative and those of gay men and (less explicitly) 
lesbians to be deviations, while leaving bisexual orientations off the map entirely. The 
papers that I’ve written using a discursive framework address this topic (Hegarty, 
1997, 2003a). Because I was in such a quantitative department when I got interested 
in this, I also began to do survey research that looked at essentialism (Hegarty & 
Pratto, 2001b), and research that questioned attribution theory’s claim that biological 
determinist beliefs about sexual orientation mitigate prejudice (Hegarty, 2002). Again, 
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I was less interested in epistemological purity than in talking to multiple audiences in 
psychology about heteronormativity in the biological theories.  
 
MB: I can see how your own interests are formed by queer theory, but what of the 
rest of traditional social psychology? Is there anything else that it can learn from 
queer theory? 
 
PH: I think we could tell the history of social psychology very differently from a 
queer perspective. Imagine a book like Frances Cherry’s (1995) book The stubborn 
particulars of social psychology that focused on queer issues, such as Kitty 
Genovese’s murder being a homophobic hate crime. I think queer theory would have 
us think about the affective nature of experimental work. Lubek and Stam (1995) have 
done some work on the masculinist pleasures of abusive cognitive dissonance 
experiments. But there must be dozens of queer stories in there, what with all of that 
dressing up and pretending in laboratories. I certainly feel that I am doing gender 
differently when I talk about experiments to colleagues than when I talk about 
constructionism. Putting on a lab coat – literally or figuratively - is a highly gendered 
act. Haraway (1991) talks about scientific cultures as places where new ways of doing 
gender are invented. That would be a useful way to think about the history of social 
psychology research practices.  
 
MB: And what might an engagement with queer theory produce for future social 
psychologies? 
One of queer theory’s most important contributions was to call attention to the ways 
that modern epistemologies flip back and forth between conceptualizing sexuality as 
an act and as an identity in ways that create discriminatory effects (e.g., Butler, 1996; 
Halley, 1993; Rollins, 2004; Sedgwick, 1990). Sean Massey and I describe how the 
act/identity distinction opens up new ways of reading the experimental literature on 
heterosexism (Hegarty & Massey, in press). Let me give you an example. 
Traditionally, social psychology experiments on prejudice have used confederates or 
vignettes to establish that the ‘target’ of the study is either gay/lesbian or straight. 
This is often done by having the target mention a same-sex relationship, membership 
in a gay/lesbian student group, or wearing an item of clothing that signals their sexual 
orientation clearly. different reactions to such targets are read as evidence of 
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discrimination based on sexual identity. However we could also read them as different 
reactions to different identity performances. Just because someone is lesbian or gay 
doesn’t mean they always wear a t-shirt that tells you so! Indeed mentioning a 
relationship, involvement in a club, or wearing a t-shirt might are all very different 
kinds of identity performance; there is no reason to assume their psychological 
equivalence. Shouldn’t we then have experiments that look not only at ‘gay’ and 
‘straight’ targets but also at different reactions to different kinds of enactments of 
these sexual identities? This in turns makes us ask: what differences would be most 
important to study? This is the kind of thing queer theory can do in psychology; take a 
body of seemingly factual knowledge, unpack its implicit assumptions, make 
available alternative readings, and open up new lines of inquiry that were not obvious 
before.  
 
MB: That doesn’t sound too radical. 
 
PH: The Foucauldian in me is very suspicious of things that announce their 
radicalness. Gil Scott-Heron sang that the revolution will not be televised, but some 
people still seem to think it will be published in a psychology journal.  
 
MB: We have talked a lot about research on prejudice. But, of course, experiments 
provide very little room for reflecting on potential researcher prejudice. Do you think 
prejudice is still commonplace in psychology? 
 
PH: Heterosexism – prejudice against sexual minorities - is very much alive and well. 
But it often goes undetected because of its subtlety. If you look at shifts in public 
opinion over the last twenty years there has been a clear increase in straight people’s 
endorsement of the abstract principles of equality and equal rights around sexual 
orientation (Yang, 1999). However, by other measures, heterosexuals still hold quite 
negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (and probably towards bisexual 
people too who are less often mentioned by the pollsters). In social psychological 
terms, we could say that heterosexism is modernizing; more and more heterosexual 
people are caught in an ideological dilemma between principles of equality and a 
residual dislike of lesbians and gay men. In a discourse analytic study, Elizabeth Peel 
(2001) called this kind of prejudice ‘mundane heterosexism’ and other discourse 
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analysts have examined how people inoculate themselves against the charge of 
heterosexism when they are expressing potentially controversial views (e.g., Gough, 
2002; Speer & Potter, 2000?). Similarly, experimental findings in recent years have 
shown that heterosexuals still discriminate against lesbians and gay men, but only 
when their discrimination is likely to go undetected (Hebl, Foster, Mannix, & 
Dovidio, 2002; Hegarty et al., 2004; Moreno & Bodenhausen, 2001; Morrison & 
Morrison, 2002; Swim, Ferguson & Hyers, 1999). I think researchers working within 
very different traditions are all picking up on this now (Hodges & Peel, 2004).  
 
Within psychology, mundane, modern, subtle heterosexism is also very much in 
force. In the two and a half years that I’ve been in the UK, I’ve seen numerous 
academic psychologists pepper their talks with comments like ‘odds and sods’ or 
‘bugger this’ or talk of how a problem will ‘bite you on the arse’ with absolutely no 
reflexivity that their idiomatic language abjects some of the most crucial ways that 
many gay men (and many many others) have sex. This is part of a broader dynamic of 
heteronormativity. In spite of decades of work in lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
queer studies, academics still often talk as if we had somehow all been magically 
transported into a world where everyone is always unproblematically straight, and we 
have all signed a contract agreeing to abject same-sex practices in banal ways 
throughout the day. It is that tendency to take heterosexuality as the norm, always and 
everywhere, that makes ‘lesbian and gay psychology’ seem like ‘specialized’ or 
‘applied’ work. I think that lesbian and gay psychologists and feminist psychologists 
are similar in this regard. That’s why the Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section and 
POWS will always be important. 
 
MB: Just as you were taking over as Chair there was a major debate in the letters 
page of The Psychologist concerning evolutionary psychology and sexual orientation. 
First let’s review what happened. A letter was published in October 2003 arguing for 
the consideration of an evolutionary hypothesis about homophobia – the author 
suggested that homophobia was ending and that this would lead to fewer lesbians and 
gay men being forced into marriages out of social convention such that homosexuality 
might die out in a few generations. A group of clinical psychologists wrote to 
complain about the letter and called attention to its stigmatizing effects. A huge 
amount of space was given over to letters that replicated each other and tended to 
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argue that the second letter was censoring the first. You and I were both involved in 
writing a response from the Section Committee defending the right to speak out 
against homophobic science on the grounds that standards for objectivity in 
psychology are contested. The whole debate casts a shadow over a Special Issue of 
The Psychologist on sexuality, which Catherine Butler, Lyndsey Moon and I are co-
editing. What was your take on this? 
 
PH: There is much to say about this. The letter from the Section expressed many of 
my views. I am filled with collective shame for psychologists everywhere when 
colleagues leap to defend their rights to free speech as absolute and excuse themselves 
from listening to the people that they claim to represent in their theories. I think that 
what could not be said or heard in the pages of The Psychologist, but can be said here, 
is how masculinist this defence of ‘free speech’ can be. The treatment of people as 
objects of a natural science who do not get any voice in deciding how science about 
them might get done is a complete importation of a masculinist natural science model 
of argumentation into human affairs. It is radically undemocratic. Often its most 
determined advocates have been explicitly exclusionary. Consider Tichener who 
excluded women from The Experimentalists – a crucially important professional body 
in early 20th century American psychology - for twenty-five years so that he could 
have this kind of rugged no-nonsense talk about data with other boys (Furumoto, 
1988). There is an ignorant belief in psychology that it is cleverer and more scientific 
to talk about people as if they were data, than to actually engage with them about 
what kinds of research they would like to see done. This is the kind of thinking that 
makes science exclusionary and creates the need to ‘give psychology away’ or ‘make 
it accessible.’ 
 
Feminists have always been ahead of more traditional psychologists in this area. The 
irony is that complete disregard for the views of the people that you write about, and 
the kinds of science that they might want to see crafted is put forward in the service of 
contesting ‘censorship.’  I am not arguing that experiments are wrong. How could I? 
But I am arguing that a mastery of issues of research design and statistics is not a 
complete training for doing science about meaningful human affairs.  
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MB: Let’s return to the Section for a moment. What other changes would you like to 
see happen in UK psychology during your time as chair? 
 
PH: I think that psychologists sell themselves short when they think that LGBTQ 
psychology is a ‘niche market’ that doesn’t concern them. There was a really good 
example of this at a critical psychology conference at Bath University in 2003. Ian 
Hodges (2003) put together a very strong symposium that brought together social 
psychologists, clinical psychologists and one doctor to talk about homophobia, and 
everyone ended up talking to empty chairs. Then, throughout the conference people 
bemoaned that critical psychology often just preached to the choir and didn’t engage 
with psychologists who worked with real distressed people day-to-day. It was a 
classic case of people assuming that there would be nothing theoretical going on at the 
LGBTQ session and so not bothering to go. The same thing happens when sessions 
are organized around disability, or even feminism. I am delighted that this dynamic 
didn’t emerge at the sexuality sessions at the POWS annual conference in 2004. 
Those sessions were well-attended and the discussions were engaging.  
 
MB: Are you aiming for new kinds of knowledges with last year’s BPS funded 
workshop on building bridges between lesbian and gay psychologists and partners in 
the voluntary and community sector (University of Surrey, March 2004)? 
 
PH: Certainly. And there was a lot of enthusiasm on the day about the potential for 
such links, but also a lot of evidence about how much work needs to be done to create 
such an understanding. Some people from the voluntary sector continue to fear 
involvement with academics who just use them to recruit subjects and don’t see non-
academics as a source of expert knowledge. There are also material differences in the 
ways we work. One of the delegates went to give me back some of the complimentary 
stationary that she had been given at the start of the day. Organizing and running the 
event was a learning experience for me about the privilege of being an academic, and 
the kinds of wastefulness that it encourages. However, I still hope that workshop will 
be the beginning of something larger. 
 




PH: LGBTQ Psychology can’t remain as just an ‘optional extra’ or a minority voice 
that simply protests its victimization. To use Piaget’s (1952) terms, I hope the changes 
are more about British psychology’s accommodation than LGBTQ psychology’s 
assimilation, because psychology’s basic understanding of objectivity is 
heteronormative, and that costs everyone dearly. I also think it is becoming 
increasingly important to think about LGBTQ psychology globally as parallel groups 
have formed in Australia, Canada, and Europe and are likely to form elsewhere in the 
future. This is not an area of psychology where we should take our lead from the 
USA, where the political climate is so hostile that critical psychology is still 
underdeveloped. Finally, the Section needs to diversify. At the moment its 
membership is largely based in the South of England and is largely white and middle-
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